Research

Below is the list of selected publications. For the full list, please see my CV.

Trade Policy, Public Opinion and Voting Behavior

Target, Information, and Trade Preferences: Evidence from Survey Experiment in East Asia (with Jong Hee Park, Inbok Rhee and Joonseok Yang)
American Journal of Political Science, 2023, 67(4): 898–914

Abstract

Protectionist measures often have target countries, and public support for such measures depends on who the targets are. We identify such target effects on protectionist sentiments and examine the effects of information in tempering protectionist sentiments in East Asia. Using an original survey experiment in China, Japan, and South Korea, we test how providing information about the costs of protectionism changes public attitudes toward targeted protectionist measures. We found that providing a target country identity increased public support for protectionism by 8.6%. Providing cost information, on the other hand, reduces support for protectionism by 10%. We also found that information and target effects persist in the presence of the other: Receiving cost information reduces support for both general and targeted protectionism but does not necessarily mute the target effect. Similarly, when reputation and retaliation costs are associated with protectionism, knowing a target country identity still increases public support for protectionism.

Do Voters Reward Politicians for Trade Liberalization? Evidence from South Korea (with Sujin Cha)
Review of International Organizations, 2022, 17: 751–780

Abstract

Do voters reward politicians for trade liberalization? We examine this question by analyzing voter responses in South Korea to the US-Korea Trade Agreement. Exploiting a change in party positions on the FTA over time, we examine the effects of different party positions on outcomes in the legislative and presidential elections. We find that voters who expect direct gains (losses) specifically from the treaty increase (decrease) support for the pro-trade party. However, voters in export-oriented industries do not reward politicians for a free trade agreement that does not directly affect their well-being. Our analysis of seven waves of individual-level panel survey data also demonstrates that a short-term change in a candidate's position on the FTA influences voter decisions in the upcoming presidential election. The findings suggest that voter preferences with regard to trade can materialize into voting behavior when voters have a clear ex ante expectation of specific gains or losses from the trade policy.

The Politics of Trade Adjustment vs. Trade Protection (with Krzysztof Pelc)
Comparative Political Studies, 2021, 54(13): 2354–2381

Abstract

The United States' Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program seeks to help workers transition away from jobs lost to import competition. By contrast, trade remedies like antidumping seek to directly reduce the effect of competition at the border. Though they have very different economic effects, we show that trade adjustment and protectionism act as substitutes. Using the first geo-coded measure of US trade protectionist demands, we show that controlling for trade shocks, counties with a history of successful TAA petitions see fewer calls for trade protection. This effect holds when we confine our analysis to the steel industry, a heavy user of antidumping duties. And though they are both means of addressing import exposure, the two policy options have distinct political effects: in particular, successful TAA petitions carry a significant electoral benefit for Democratic candidates. Greater recognition of the substitutability of trade compensation and protectionism would improve governments' response to import exposure.

How Responsive is Trade Adjustment Assistance? (with Krzysztof Pelc)
Political Science Research and Methods, 2021, 9(4): 889–898

Abstract

How responsive is the US' Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to the labor dislocation that results from trade integration? Recent findings suggest that the world's most ambitious trade adjustment program barely responds to import shocks, and that the shortfall is made up by disability insurance and early retirement. This holds considerable implications: TAA offers a lens onto the central question of whether developed democracies can effectively redistribute the gains from international economic integration. We take a closer look at these results. Using petition-level data over a 20-year period, we find that TAA is between 1.7 and 3.3 times more responsive than current estimates suggest. Yet the news is not all good. As we show, the responsiveness of TAA has decreased considerably since the 1990s, just as developed democracies started facing increasing pushback against liberalization. This shortfall, in turn, has political consequences: areas where TAA has been least responsive were also more likely to shift toward voting for Trump in the 2016 Presidential election. Our findings speak to the considerable challenge governments face in aiding workers "left behind" by liberalization.

Tariffs as Electoral Weapons: The Political Geography of the U.S.–China Trade War (with Yotam Margalit)
International Organization, 2021, 75(1): 1–38

Abstract

In response to President Trump instigating conflict over trade with China, the Chinese government countered by issuing tariffs on thousands of products worth over USD 110 billion in US exports. We explore whether China's tariffs reflected a strategy to apply counterpressure by hurting political support for the president's party. We also assess the strategy's impact on the 2018 midterm elections and examine the mechanism underlying the resulting electoral shift. We find strong evidence that Chinese tariffs systematically targeted US goods that had production concentrated in Republican-supporting counties, particularly when located in closely contested Congressional districts. This apparent strategy was successful: targeted areas were more likely to turn against Republican candidates. Using data on campaign communications, local search patterns online, and an original national survey, we find evidence that voters residing in areas affected by the tariffs were more likely to learn about the trade war, recognize its adverse impact, and assign the Republicans responsibility for the escalating dispute. These findings demonstrate how domestic political institutions can be a source of vulnerability in interstate disputes.

Trade Competition and Worker Compensation: Why Do Some Receive More than Others? (with Krzysztof Pelc)
International Studies Quarterly, 2021, 65(1): 109–121

Abstract

Dealing with the distributional consequences of trade liberalization has become one of the key challenges facing developed democracies. Governments have created compensation programs to ease labor market adjustment, but these resources tend to be distributed highly unevenly. What accounts for the variation? Looking at the largest trade adjustment program in existence, the US' Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), we argue that petitions for compensation are largely driven by legislative attitudes. When legislators express negative views of TAA, individuals in their districts become less likely to petition for, and receive, compensation. This effect is especially pronounced in Republican districts. An underprovision of TAA, in turn, renders individuals more likely to demand other forms of government support, like in-kind medical benefits. We use roll-call votes, bill sponsorships, and floor speeches to measure elite attitudes, and we proxy for the demand for trade adjustment using economic shocks from Chinese import competition. In sum, we show how the individual beliefs of political elites can be self-fulfilling.

Informed Preferences? The Impact of Unions on Workers' Policy Views (with Yotam Margalit)
American Journal of Political Science, 2017, 61(3): 728–743

Abstract

Despite declining memberships, labor unions still represent large shares of electorates worldwide. Yet their political clout remains contested. To what extent, and in what way, do unions shape workers' political preferences? We address these questions by combining unique survey data of American workers and a set of inferential strategies that exploit two sources of variation: the legal choice that workers face in joining or opting out of unions and the over-time reversal of a union's policy position. Focusing on the issue of trade, we offer evidence that unions influence their members' policy preferences in a significant and theoretically predictable manner. In contrast, we find that self-selection into membership accounts at most for a quarter of the observed "union effect." The study illuminates the impact of unions in cohering workers' voice and provides insight on the role of information provision in shaping how citizens form policy preferences.

China in the Global Economy

The Politics of Rejection: Explaining Chinese Import Refusals (with Rebecca L. Perlman & Grace Zeng)
American Journal of Political Science, 2025, 69(2): 438–454

Abstract

Health and safety standards offer a convenient means by which governments can claim to be protecting the population, even while pursuing more parochial goals. In the realm of international trade, such standards have most often been studied as a means of veiled protectionism. Yet precisely because health and safety standards create ambiguity about their intent, nations may seek to use them for goals that extend well beyond protecting domestic industry. We theorize that governments will, at times, enforce regulations in ways intended to exact political retribution. To show this, we collect original data on import refusals by Chinese border inspectors between 2011 and 2019. Though ostensibly intended to keep dangerous products out of the hands of Chinese consumers, we demonstrate that import refusals have systematically been used by the Chinese government as a way to punish states that act against China's interest.

Losing Hearts and Minds? Unpacking the Effects of Chinese Soft Power Initiatives in Africa (with Sujin Cha & Yehzee Ryoo)
Asian Survey, 2023, 63(1): 1–30

Abstract

China has embarked on various initiatives to win the hearts and minds of African citizens. Does this strategy contribute to China's soft power in the region? To answer this question, we focus on two types of initiatives: cultural diplomacy and development finance. Using geolocation information on China's aid projects and its Confucius Institutes, combined with a survey of more than 50,000 African citizens, we find that both types of soft power initiatives increase citizens' awareness of Chinese influence in the region. Examining the effects of geographic proximity to project sites, we find that China's development assistance does not increase Africans' appreciation of China's development model, but its cultural diplomacy does. Overall, we find that among individuals exposed to China's development finance and cultural diplomacy, a greater awareness of China's influence in the region does not translate into a positive assessment of this influence.

Severing the Belt and Road: Overseas Chinese Networks and COVID-19 Travel Restrictions (with Adrian J. Shin & Yujeong Yang)
Foreign Policy Analysis, 2023, 19(2): orac038

Abstract

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments around the world have imposed a wide variety of entry restrictions on international travel. Historical cases illustrate that public health concerns based on entrenched prejudices toward immigrant communities have led to restrictive measures against migration from foreign countries. Using our new dataset, COVID-19 Travel Restrictions and Categories, we examine whether Chinese migrant networks around the world have driven government decisions to bar the entry of Chinese nationals and travelers from China in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our survival analysis of China-specific travel restrictions from January to March 2020 shows that not all Chinese migrant networks were important determinants. We find that entry bans on travel from China emerged more quickly in countries where a large number of temporary Chinese migrants work in clustered sites of Chinese contracted projects.

Buying Influence? Rotating Leadership in ASEAN and Allocation of Chinese Foreign Aid (with Taegyun Lim)
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 2023, 23(2): 351–377

Abstract

China has expanded its economic footprint in Southeast Asian countries by providing a growing amount of development finance to the region. We examine the allocation of Chinese foreign aid toward Southeast Asian countries exploiting the exogenous variation of rotating leadership within Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN). As the ASEAN Chair possesses the agenda-setting power and represents the organization, China strategically allocates more development aid to the ASEAN Chair to augment its influence in the region. Our analysis of Chinese aid allocation between 2000 and 2017 finds that taking the leadership position at ASEAN appears to be significantly associated with an increase of official development aid flows from China, while other commercial flows are only weakly associated with the leadership position. Our findings underscore the importance of considering the regional context in examining foreign aid allocation and show that a donor can target a regional organization to exert its political influence in the region.

When Top-Down Meets Bottom-Up: Local Adoption of Social Policy Reform in China (with Xian Huang)
Governance, 2020, 33(2): 343–363

Abstract

Authoritarian local leaders face two driving forces in social policymaking: top-down pressure from the regime and bottom-up motivations derived from local conditions. Existing studies recognize the importance of both forces, but remain unclear as to how they interact and which of them is more influential in driving local policy adoption. Focusing on two health insurance integration policies in China, we find that when the policy entails substantial class or distributive conflicts and bureaucratic friction, top-down pressure for compliance is a dominant driver for local policy adoption; when the policy does not entail such conflicts or bureaucratic infighting, bottom-up motivations based on local economic geography together with top-down pressure drive local adoption. We find support for this argument from an analysis of an original city-level data set in China from 2004 to 2016. This study has implications for social policy reform, decentralization, and government responsiveness in authoritarian countries with multilevel governance.

Media Bias against Foreign Firms as a Veiled Trade Barrier: Evidence from Chinese Newspapers
American Political Science Review, 2018, 112(4): 954–970

Abstract

While the rules of international trade regimes prevent governments from employing protectionist instruments, governments continue to seek out veiled means of supporting their national industries. This article argues that the news media can serve as one channel for governments to favor domestic industries. Focusing on media coverage of auto recalls in China, I reveal a systematic bias against foreign automakers in those newspapers under strict government control. I further analyze subnational reporting patterns, exploiting variation in the level of regional government interest in the automobile industry. The analysis suggests that the media's home bias is driven by the government's protectionist interests but rules out the alternative hypothesis that home bias simply reflects the nationalist sentiment of readers. I show that this home bias in news coverage has meaningful impact on actual consumer behavior, combining automobile sales data and information on recall-related web searches.

Political Economy of Environment and Energy

Gasoline in the Voter's Pocketbook: Driving Times to Work and the Electoral Implications of Gasoline Price Fluctuations (with Joonseok Yang)
American Politics Research, 2022, 50(3): 312–319

Abstract

Gasoline prices are often a heated topic during presidential election campaigns in the United States. Yet, presidents have limited control over gasoline prices. Do voters reward or punish the president for changes in gasoline prices? Why might voters blame the president for an outcome beyond direct presidential control? This study addresses these questions by testing the effects of gasoline prices on pocketbook retrospection by voters. To capture the personal economic burden of gasoline prices, we rely on average driving times to work, given the inelastic nature of gasoline consumption for commuting. The results provide evidence for pocketbook voting: constituencies with longer average driving times to work are more likely to hold the president accountable for gasoline price increases. These findings have broader implications regarding electoral accountability and rationality in voting.

State Policy and Lobbying in a Federal System: Evidence from the Production Tax Credit for Renewable Energy, 1998–2012 (with Johannes Urpelainen and Joonseok Yang)
State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 2021, 21(1): 1–30

Abstract

State policies shape firms' incentives to lobby in the United States, but the existing lobbying literature mostly ignores these incentives. Using lobbying records for all electric utilities in the United States from 1998 to 2012, we examine how state policies affect federal lobbying by both proponents and opponents of federal support for the renewable energy policy. Our theory predicts that supportive state policies reduce the returns to lobbying by both proponents and opponents. Empirically, we show that when the federal production tax credit for renewable energy is about to expire, electric utilities from states without renewable portfolio standards become more likely to lobby than those from states with these policies. Because the timing of the expiration of the production tax credit is quasi-random, these findings carry a causal interpretation. Using text analysis techniques, we also show that the lobbying efforts are focused on energy and environmental issues while lobbying on unrelated topics remains unaffected.

Environmental Degradation and Public Opinion: The Case of Air Pollution in Vietnam (with S.P. Harish, Ryan Kennedy, Xiaomeng Jin and Johannes Urpelainen)
Journal of Environment & Development, 2020, 29(2): 196–222

Abstract

Air pollution is a pressing problem of public health for developing countries, but governments have few incentives to abate air pollution without public awareness of the issue. Focusing on the case of Vietnam, we examine the determinants of public awareness of air pollution. Using representative survey data for the entire country from 2017, we find that local exposure to air pollution increases public awareness and reduces satisfaction with governments but does not provoke opposition to coal-fired power generation. In contrast, education leads people to oppose coal-fired power plants. These results suggest that while local air pollution contributes to awareness and dissatisfaction with the government, support for effective policy measures depends on education levels.

Environmental Effects of GATT/WTO Membership: An Empirical Evaluation (with Johannes Urpelainen and Joonseok Yang)
International Interactions, 2019, 45(4): 917–932

Abstract

One of the great questions for scholars of international relations and economics concerns the relationship between the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the natural environment. Does membership in the multilateral trade regime constrain environmental regulation and increase the environmental burden of national economies? Do countries pay a heavy environmental price for trade liberalization? Although this question has been debated extensively, there is little statistical evidence to contribute the debate. We provide a comprehensive statistical analysis of the environmental effects of joining the multilateral trade regime. We collected data on a variety of environmental policies, institutions, and outcomes that should be influenced by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO membership if the predictions of environmental pessimists or optimists are valid. A wide range of statistical models designed to identify the causal effect of the GATT/WTO on the environmental indicators shows that joining the GATT/WTO does not have negative effects on environmental quality.

The Broad Impact of a Narrow Conflict: How Natural Resource Windfalls Shape Policy and Politics (with Jasper Cooper and Johannes Urpelainen)
Journal of Politics, 2018, 80(2): 630–646

Abstract

Access to natural resources creates a political conflict between the expected economic winners and their environmental opponents, but the effects of such conflict on policy and politics remain unclear. To examine the scope of such effects, we exploit the rapid and unanticipated technological breakthroughs in the "fracking" of shale gas. During the past decade, shale gas production around the Marcellus Shale formation in the Northeastern United States expanded rapidly. Using a quasi-experimental design, we examine how access to shale gas in electoral districts changed the voting record of House Representatives on environmental policy relative to neighboring districts without access. Votes become 15–20 percentage points less likely to be in favor of the environment. The best explanation for this effect is the strong electoral performance of (anti-environmental) Republicans in shale-affected districts. The narrow conflict has a broad impact: access to natural resources puts downward pressure on environmental policy across the board.

Environmental Public Opinion in U.S. States (with Johannes Urpelainen)
Environmental Politics, 2018, 27(1): 89–114

Abstract

Partisan polarization of public opinion is a major trend in American environmental politics. While the national pattern is widely recognized, scholars know much less about the polarization of public opinion over time at the state level. This lack of knowledge is unfortunate because geographic variation in the polarization of opinion is essential for explaining the origins of partisan polarization and evaluating its consequences for policy. To fill the gap, the multilevel regression and poststratification technique is applied to provide credible estimates of state-level environmental public opinion for both Democrats and Republicans, 1973–2012. It appears that the growing partisan gap reflects increased pro-environmental opinion among Democrats across many states, whereas Republican state-level public opinion is converging toward a much lower baseline. Cross-state variation among both parties has decreased over time, contributing to greater partisan polarization in the aggregate. Changes in the sorting of voters in and out of political parties cannot explain these patterns of polarization.

The Polarization of American Environmental Policy: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Senate and House Votes, 1971–2013 (with Johannes Urpelainen)
Review of Policy Research, 2017, 34(4): 456–484

Abstract

The partisan polarization of environmental policy is an important development in American politics, but it remains unclear how much such polarization reflects voter preferences, as opposed to disagreements between partisan elites. We conduct a regression discontinuity analysis of all major environmental and energy votes in the Senate and the House, 1971–2013. In total, we have 368,974 individual roll call votes by senators and House Representatives. The causal effect of electing a Democrat instead of a Republican in close elections on pro-environmental voting is large: when a Democrat wins, pro-environmental voting increases by over 40 percentage points. Because of the quasi-experimental research design, this difference cannot be attributed to the median voter's preferences. Next, we test hypotheses concerning possible explanations for the elite partisan conflict. The Democrat–Republican gap is the widest when fossil fuel interests make contributions exclusively to Republicans and when state-level public opinion is polarized.

Electric Utilities and American Climate Policy: Lobbying by Expected Winners and Losers (with Johannes Urpelainen and Joonseok Yang)
Journal of Public Policy, 2016, 36(2): 251–275

Abstract

When and why do individual companies lobby on environmental policies? Given the structural strength of business interests, the answer to this question is important for explaining policy. However, evidence on the strategic lobbying behaviour of individual companies remains scarce. We use data from lobbying disclosure reports on all major climate bills introduced during the 111th Congress (2009–2010). We then link the lobbying disclosure reports to detailed data on the fuel choices of all electric utilities in the United States along with socioeconomic, institutional and political data from the states where the utilities operate. The expected winners (renewable energy, natural gas users) from climate policy are much more likely to lobby individually on federal legislation than the expected losers (coal users). We find that expected winners lobby for specific provisions and rents as a private good, whereas expected losers concentrate their efforts on collective action through trade associations and committees to prevent climate legislation. The results suggest that the supporters of climate policy believed the probability of federal climate legislation to be nontrivial.